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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by Charles E. Cox, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Each year the United States Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issue numerous decisions
concerning the rights afforded to criminal defendants by the United
States Constitution. This Article surveys selected Eleventh Circuit and
Supreme Court decisions issued in 2013 that will likely be of interest to
criminal law practitioners.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ... .
In United States v. Martinez,2 the defendant challenged her prosecution on two First Amendment grounds. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),'
Martinez was charged with knowingly transmitting a threatening
communication." The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea,

* Attorney at Law, Macon, Georgia. LaGrange College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1982);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1986). Law
Clerk to the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick of the Middle District of Georgia (1986-1987).
Assistant United States Attorney, Middle District of Georgia (1989-1995). Member, State
Bar of Georgia; National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.

2. 736 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2013).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
4. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 983. The defendant sent the following communication to a
talk-show host:
Dear Ms. Kaufman I was so thrilled to see you speak in person for congressman
elect west. I was especially exited [sic] to hear you encourage us to exercise our
second amendment gun rights. I felt your plan to organize people with guns in
the hills of Kentucky and else where was a great idea. I know that you know one
election is not enough to take our country back from the illegal aliens, jews,
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reserving the right to raise two constitutional issues on appeal.' First,
the defendant asserted that her indictment was constitutionally infirm
under Virginia v. Black,6 because it failed to allege she subjectively
intended to communicate a threat to injure others. Second, the
defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is unconstitutionally overbroad
if subjective intent is not an element of the offense.' Applying de novo
review to the defendant's constitutional challenges, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the defendant's conviction.8
The Court recognized that "the First Amendment generally prohibits
the [glovernment from restricting speech based on its message or
viewpoint," but certain narrowly drawn categories of speech may be
restricted based specifically on the content of the speech.' "True
threats' are one such category of unprotected speech."o The critical
inquiry in a true-threat case is to distinguish "true threats from mere
political hyperbole.""
The defendant relied on a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Bagdasarian,2 to
support her argument that true threats require proof that the speaker
subjectively intended the speech to be a threat." The court in Bagdasarian held that even a threat that "objective observers would reasonably perceive .

.

. as a threat of injury or death" is entitled to First

Amendment protection, unless the speaker subjectively intended the

muslims, and illuminati who are running the show. I am so glad you support
people who think like me. i'm planning something big around a government
building here in Broward County, maybe a post office, maybe even a school, rm
going to walk in and teach all the government hacks working there what the 2nd
amendment is all about. Can I count on your help? you and those people you
know in Kentucky? we'll end this year of 2010 in a blaze of glory for sure. thanks
for your support mrs kaufman. what does sarah say, don't retreat, reload! let's
make headlines girl!
Id.
5. Id. at 983-84.
6. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
7. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984.
8. Id. at 984 n.1, 990.
9. Id. at 984. In United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), the Court identified
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct as
categories of speech that are not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court in
Stevens declined to add depictions of animal cruelty to that list. Id. at 468-69.
10. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012)).
11. Id.
12. 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
13. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 985.
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speech to be a threat.14 The defendant in Martinez claimed that her
indictment was constitutionally insufficient pursuant to Black and
Bagdasarian because it did not allege she subjectively intended to
convey a threat."
The court in Martinez noted that most federal courts of appeal,
including the Eleventh Circuit, use an objective standard to define true
threats.e Under the objective standard, a "true threat" is one that
"would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its
originator will act according to its tenor."7
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
Supreme Court's decision in Black added a subjective-intent element to
the true-threats doctrine."8 The statute at issue in Black made it
unlawful to burn a cross with the "intent of intimidating any person.""
The statute provided that the mere act of burning a cross was prima
facie evidence of the intent to intimidate, and this provision effectively
made the statute a strict-liability offense.2" In that context, the
Supreme Court in Black defined a true threat as a "statement] where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals."2' The Eleventh Circuit in Martinez rejected the argument
that Black created a subjective-intent element.22 Instead, the court
reasoned that the real problem in Black was one of overbreadth because
the statute at issue lacked any mens rea requirement.2 3 Because the
statute at issue in Black provided that the mere fact of burning a cross
was prima facie evidence of the intent to intimidate, the statute
essentially permitted a jury to convict in every cross-burning case in
which a defendant exercised the constitutional right not to put on a
defense.'
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Martinez's overbreadth challenge
because the statute was not susceptible to a number of unconstitutional

14. Bagdasarian,652 F.3d at 1116.
15. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 985.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 986 (quoting United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id.
19. Black, 538 U.S. at 348 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (2013)).
20. Id. at 365.
21. Id. at 359.
22. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 986.
23. Id. at 986-87.
24. Id. at 989.
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applications.2 5 The elements of the offense with which Martinez was
charged required the government to prove that she transmitted a
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, that she transmitted
the communication knowingly, and that "the communication would be
construed by a reasonable person as a serious expression of an intent to
inflict bodily harm or death."2 6 Applying those elements, the statute
was limited to "true threats" and did not criminalize protected speech."
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, a law is not overbroad simply because one
might be able to hypothesize how the challenged statute would have
some deterrent effect on protected speech." Martinez's overbreadth
challenge failed because she did not show a "realistic danger" that the
statute, when properly construed, would "significantly" infringe on
protected speech."
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
A.

Investigatory Stops and Frisks
In Terry v. Ohio,3 1 the Supreme Court for the first time held that the
Fourth Amendment did not require all seizures to be supported by
probable cause.32 The court in Terry held that there was "an entire
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the onthe-spot observations of the officer on the beat-lthat] historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the
warrant procedure."'
In United States v. Valerio," the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the officers' full-body pat-down of the defendant,

25. Id. at 988.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id (quotingMembers of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,

801 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
31.
32.
33.
34.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 19, 30-31.
Id. at 20.
718 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013).
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Valerio, was unconstitutional because it took place outside the "rubric
of police conduct" the Supreme Court addressed in Terry."
The facts in Valerio are particularly compelling. Agents twice
surveilled a store selling hydroponic growing equipment, under the
assumption that people purchasing hydroponic growing equipment are
likely growing marijuana. On both occasions the officers observed
Valerio arrive in a vehicle that did not have a license plate, back into a
parking space, make a purchase, and leave. On Valerio's second trip to
the hydroponics store, agents followed Valerio to a warehouse, where
they observed him park near bay 15 of the warehouse and walk towards
the warehouse, although they did not otherwise see where he went. The
next night the officers brought a drug dog to sniff the doors on the side
of the warehouse where bay 15 was located. The drug dog did not alert
on bay 15, but it did alert on bay 14. Based on this information, the
officers obtained a search warrant for bay 14. Their subsequent search
revealed no evidence that Valerio was running a marijuana grow
operation out of bay 14 or 15. Instead, the officers found that bay 14
was owned by an individual who operated a recording studio out of bay
14, and he informed the agents that about a third of the bands who
recorded there smoked marijuana while recording."
Not to be deterred by their failure to find any evidence that Valerio
was involved in a grow operation at the warehouse, and nearly a week
after the officers had observed Valerio doing anything, one of the lawenforcement officers directed two other agents to attempt a "voluntary
citizen encounter" with Valerio." Rather than driving to Valerio's
house, knocking on his door, and asking to speak with him, the agents
instead parked across the street from Valerio's home and waited for him
to leave in his vehicle. Once the officers observed Valerio leave his home
and get into his vehicle, they threw caution and the Constitution to the
wind, blocked Valerio's exit from his driveway, drew their weapons on
Valerio, and ordered him to get out of his vehicle. After some questioning Valerio admitted to growing marijuana inside bays 15 and 16 at the
warehouse." Based on those facts, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida denied a motion to suppress a subse-

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
of Valerio.

at 1324-25.
at 1322-23.
at 1323.
The opinion in Valerio does not provide a specific description of the questioning
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quent search of the warehouse in which agents found over one hundred
marijuana plants."
The court in Valerio noted that the search was valid only if the agents'
seizure of Valerio in his driveway was a valid Terry stop."o The court
stated that "[t]he investigative stop contemplated by Terry is not a
policing tool that can be constitutionally deployed in any context in
which law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that an individual is
involved in criminal activity.""' The court emphasized that Terry was
a narrow exception to the warrant requirement, and officers "may not
use Terry as an end-run around the warrant requirement in the context
of a standard, on-going police investigation." 2 The timing of the
officers' conduct in Valerio placed the case well outside the Terry
exception; there was no exigency that necessitated the stop.43 The stop
was "not responsive to the development of suspicion within a dynamic
or urgent law enforcement environment."". The court reversed the
denial of the motion to suppress and vacated Valerio's conviction."
In 1981 in Michigan v. Summers," the Supreme Court held that
officers executing a search warrant could "detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted."' The Court reasoned
that three law-enforcement interests justified this exception to the
warrant requirement.4s First was "the interest in minimizing the risk
of harm to the officers."' Second was the law-enforcement interest
that "the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the
occupants of the premises are present."o Third was "the legitimate law
enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating
evidence is found."5 However, in Bailey v. United States," none of
these interests justified the arrest and search of the defendant."

39. Id. at 1322. Evidence obtained through an illegal search may be suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 1325 n.6.
40. Id. at 1324.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1324-25.
44. Id. at 1324.
45. Id. at 1325.
46. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
47. Id. at 705.
48. Id. at 702-03.
49. Id. at 702.
50. Id. at 703.
51. Id. at 702.
52. 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
53. Id. at 1031.
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The officers in Bailey were conducting surveillance on a residence in
anticipation of executing a search warrant for a firearm. While
surveilling the residence, the officers observed Bailey and another
individual leave the house in a car. Both of these individuals matched
the description of an individual named in the search warrant, but there
were no facts indicating Bailey and the other individual were aware of
the surveillance or that a search was imminent. After the men had
driven about a mile from the residence that was to be searched, officers
pulled the car over, placed both men in handcuffs, and returned them
back to the location of the search. One of the officers told Bailey he was
being detained incident to the execution of a search warrant at the
residence." In response, Bailey exclaimed, "I don't live there. Anything you find there ain't mine, and I'm not cooperating with your
investigation."s By the time the officers returned with the two men,
the search team had discovered a gun and drugs in the residence.
Bailey and the other man were placed under arrest, and officers seized
a set of keys from Bailey incident to that arrest. The officers later
discovered Bailey's keys opened the basement of the residence.55
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
denied Bailey's motion to suppress and held that Bailey's statement
concerning his keys fitting the residence were admissible. The district
court reasoned that Bailey's initial detention was permissible under
Summers.7
The Supreme Court in Bailey reversed, with a 6-3 decision delivered
by Justice Kennedy." The Court in Bailey reasoned that in Summers,
the warrant exception authorized was permissible in part because of the
legitimate law-enforcement interests at stake, and also because the
intrusion upon personal liberty was very limited." The detention of
the occupant of a home "represents only an incremental intrusion on
personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a
valid warrant."60 The Court in Bailey emphasized that the exception
in Summers must be circumscribed because it "grants substantial
authority to police officers to detain outside of the traditional rules of the
Fourth Amendment."6 ' The Court held that a "spatial constraint

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1036.
at 1036-37.
at 1035, 1043.
at 1041.
(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703) (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 1042.
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defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is
therefore required for detentions incident to the execution of a search
warrant."62 This spatial constraint limits the exception to "the area in
which an occupant poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution
of a search warrant [and] ensures that the scope of the detention
incident to a search is confined to its underlying justification."'
The Court explained that "[dietentions incident to the execution of a
search warrant are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because
the limited intrusion on personal liberty is outweighed by the special law
enforcement interests at stake.'" In this case, however, Bailey was
more than a mile from the location to be searched, and his detention had
to be justified on some other rationale.6 5 The court's decision in Bailey
did not define the phrase "immediate vicinity to be searched." Instead,
the Court concluded,
[in closer cases courts can consider a number of factors to determine
whether an occupant was detained within the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched, including the lawful limits of the premises,
whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the
ease of reentry from the occupant's location, and other relevant
factors.?
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Standing
In 2012, the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones" held that "the
[glovernment's installation of a [global positioning system (GPS)] device
on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a 'search.'" The vehicle in Jones to which the
GPS tracking device was attached was registered to the defendant's wife,
but the defendant was the exclusive driver." Based on those facts, the
Supreme Court concluded the defendant at least had the property rights
of a bailee, but it did not "consider the Fourth Amendment significance

B.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1042-43.
65. See id. at 1043.
66. Id. at 1042.
67. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
68. Id. at 949. One cannot ignore the irony of Justice Scalia's use of original intent in
Jones to determine whether use of a satellite tracking system violated the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 950 ("At bottom, we must 'assur[e] preservation of that degree of

privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'")
(alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
69. Id. at 949 n.2.
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of [the defendant's] status."o The Court in Jones assumed the defendant had standing to challenge the placement of a GPS tracking device
on his vehicle.' Justice Scalia's opinion in Jones emphasized the tie
between property rights and Fourth Amendment protections, stating
"olur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass, at least until the latter half of the [twentieth] century."72
This tie between property interests and Fourth Amendment protections
is a recurring theme in Justice Scalia's opinions addressing Fourth
Amendment issues."
The issue of standing, not addressed in Jones, was the focus of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Gibson." In Gibson, the
Eleventh Circuit considered the standing of a passenger to challenge
evidence seized based on the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking
device." Officers installed a GPS tracking device in a vehicle owned
by co-defendant Burton, while the vehicle was sitting in defendant
Gibson's driveway. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida denied motions to suppress filed by Burton and
Gibson.76 The district court concluded that Gibson did not have

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 949.
73. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980-81(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. 708 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2013).
75. Id. at 1263.
76. Id. at 1261-63. During co-defendant Burton's motion-to-suppress hearing, one of
the agents testified that certain travel patterns of the vehicle were suspicious, in part
because the vehicle was traveling to Ocala, Florida, "a source city for narcotics." Id. at
1262. A review of case law suggests that it would be difficult to find a destination lawenforcement officers have not labeled as a destination city or source city for illegal drugs.
One would need to avoid travel to Jamaica (Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1342
(11th Cir. 2009) (Jamaica, a "source country" for illegal drugs)), Atlanta, Georgia (United
States v. Gonzalez, 952 F. Supp. 813, 816-17 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (Atlanta identified as a
"known drug destination")), New York City (United States v. $242,484.00 in U.S. Currency,
389 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (New York, a known source city for drug money)),
Miami, Florida (United States v. Smith, 201 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Miami, a
known 'source city' for narcotics")), California and the upper Midwest generally (United
States v. $141,770.00 in U.S. Currency, 157 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1998) (California, a
known drug source state, and the upper Midwest, a known drug destination area)), San
Antonio, Texas (United States v. Eighty Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars
($80,633.00), 512 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199, 1205 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (San Antonio identified as
a known source city)), Phoenix, Arizona (United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270
(10th Cir. 2001) (Phoenix, a known source for narcotics)), Tucson, Arizona (United States
v. $33,330.00 in U.S. Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159082, at *36 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6,
2012) (Tucson, a known source city for drugs)), Fort Wayne, Michigan (United States v.
Dent, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2,2013) (Fort Wayne, a known
source area for narcotics)), Chicago, Illinois (United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 543
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standing to contest the installation of the GPS tracking device." The
jury convicted Gibson, and the district court sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
Gibson was not the owner of the vehicle on which the tracking device
was installed, but he had possession and control of the vehicle at the
time the tracking device was installed. Gibson paid for the insurance
and maintenance on the vehicle, and he often drove the vehicle."
Based on these facts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Gibson had
standing to challenge the search.'o Gibson was using the vehicle with
the owner's consent, so he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vehicle."1
Gibson's victory on the standing issue was hollow. Ultimately the
court determined that admission of the unlawful evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the guilty verdict.82 The court affirmed Gibson's sentence of life imprisonment. 3
C.

Good Faith
Presumably the finding of harmless error in Gibson obviated the need
to address the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule first articulated in United States v. Leon.' The Supreme
Court in Leon held that the exclusionary rule did not bar the use of
evidence obtained by police in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but later found
unsupported by probable cause." Supreme Court decisions subsequent
to Leon have extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted in

(6th Cir. 2002) (Chicago, a known source city for narcotics)), as well as Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon (United States v. Correa, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 934, 947 n.4 (D. Neb. 2010), rev'd on othergrounds, United States v. Correa, 641
F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2011) ("In this court's experience, Los Angeles, Denver, Phoenix,
Portland, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and others have been relied on as'known' drug
source or destination cities to justify searches, often by the same officers involved in this
case.")).
77. Gibson, 708 F.3d at 1263. The co-defendant later pled guilty and testified against
Gibson; therefore, his motions to suppress were not appealed. Id. at 1267.
78. Id. at 1273.
79. Id. at 1277.
80. Id.
81. Id. Although Gibson had standing to challenge the installation and use of the
tracking device while the vehicle was in his possession, he did not have standing to
challenge use of the device when he was neither a driver nor passenger. Id. at 1278.
82. Id. at 1278-79.
83. Id. at 1283.
84. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
85. Id. at 922.
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reasonable reliance on invalidated statutes," searches resulting from
reasonable reliance on erroneous information about an arrest warrant
contained in a database maintained by judicial employees," searches
in which police mistakes resulted from "isolated negligence" by police
employees," and "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance
on binding appellate precedent."'
In United States v. Smith,90 the defendant relied on the Supreme
Court's 2012 decision in Jones to support his argument that police
officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched his home
pursuant to a warrant that, in part, relied on information collected from
warrantless GPS surveillance that occurred in 2011.91 The Eleventh
Circuit in Smith noted that at the time the officers installed GPS
trackers on Smith's vehicle, they acted in reasonable reliance upon thenbinding precedent, authorizing officers to install electronic tracking
devices on vehicles.92
In United States v. Michael," the then United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the installation of an
electronic beeper on a vehicle did not trigger constitutional concerns,
even though the officers committed a trespass in order to install the
electronic device.9' Instead, the court's analysis turned largely on the
notion that "an individual's expectation of privacy in his automobile is
less than in other property."
The court rejected Smith's attempt to distinguish between the beeper
at issue in Michael and a GPS tracking device, stating that other courts
have recognized Michael as binding precedent, and every district court
in the Eleventh Circuit that had addressed the question concluded that
Michael "clearly established the constitutionality of GPS searches

86. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
87. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).
88. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
89. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011).
90. 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013).
91. Id. at 1213, 1215, 1217.
92. Id. at 1219-20.
93. 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc).
94. Id. at 258 n.14 ("That the beeper required the DEA agents to make a technical
trespass unlike the pen register in [Smith] is not controlling. This slight physical intrusion
is insignificant if it infringes no privacy interest.").
95. Id. at 257. In contrast to the former Fifth Circuit's analysis in Michael, the
Supreme Court in Jones emphasized the tie between property rights and Fourth
Amendment protections. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50 (stating that "our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the
[twentieth] century.").
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supported only by reasonable suspicion." The court in Smith concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, as the
officers were "in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and
[were] not culpable in any way.

D. DNA Sampling
In Maryland v. King," the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of DNA samples obtained as part of a routine booking procedure." In April of 2009, Alonzo King was arrested in Maryland for firstand second-degree assault.'00 King was taken to a booking facility,
and pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act,' personnel at the
facility used a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample. Months after his
arrest for assault, the swab was matched with a DNA sample collected
in an unsolved 2003 rape case.102
King was charged with rape, and he filed a motion to suppress the
DNA match. The state trial judge denied the motion to suppress, and
King was convicted. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals set aside
the conviction, finding unconstitutional the portions of the Act authorizing DNA collection from felony arrestees.'0 ' The Supreme Court
reversed, in a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, holding that
[wihen officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for
a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be
detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate
police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.104
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and
Kagan, argued "[tihe Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for
evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is
guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence."'
Justice Scalia stressed that this "prohibition is categorical and without
exception," and that the Court has always insisted upon a justifying

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Smith, 741 F.3d at 1223-35.
Id. at 1225 (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428).
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
Id. at 1965-66.
Id. at 1965.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (West 2009).
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965-66.
Id. at 1966.
Id. at 1965, 1980.
Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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motive, apart from the investigation of a crime, to support a search
without suspicion."0o In his passionate dissent, Justice Scalia argued
that the suspicionless search of King was unnecessary because the state
could have taken a DNA sample as a consequence of King's assault
conviction.1o' Justice Scalia concluded with this observation:
The only arrestees to whom the outcome here will ever make a
difference are those who have been acquitted of the crime of arrest (so
that their DNA could not have been taken upon conviction). In other
words, this Act manages to burden uniquely the sole group for whom
the Fourth Amendment's protections ought to be most jealously
guarded: people who are innocent of the State's accusations.o
E.

Exigent Circumstances

In Missouri v. McNeely, oe the Supreme Court, in a 4-1-4 decision by
Justice Sotomayor, held that "in drunk-driving investigations, the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an
exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test
without a warrant.""o The Court refused to adopt a categorical,
bright-line rule allowing a warrantless blood test as an excessive dilution
of the "warrant requirement in a context where significant privacy
interests are at stake.""1 ' Instead, the Court reasoned that courts
could determine case by case on the totality of the circumstances
whether exigent circumstances, such as delays from the warrant
application process, justified a warrantless blood sample.112 "In short,
while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a
finding of exigency in a specific case, . . . it does not do so categorically.""13
F

Drug Dogs

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through
it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 1989.
Id.
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
Id. at 1556, 1568.
Id. at 1564.
Id. at 1563.
Id.
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cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement!"'

In Florida v. Jardines," a detective with the Miami-Dade Police
Department received a tip that marijuana was being grown at a
particular residence. A month later, the detective and a surveillance
team went to the home. After the team observed the home for fifteen
minutes and saw no activity or vehicles at the home, an officer took a
drug-sniffing dog towards the front porch of the home. As the dog began
to approach the front porch, he exhibited behavior indicating he sensed
illegal drugs. The dog handler followed the dog onto the front porch,
where the dog traced the odor's strongest point to the base of the front
door. Based on the alert by the drug dog, the detective applied for and
received a search warrant for the home. The officers discovered
marijuana plants during the search, and defendant Jardines was
charged with trafficking in cannabis." 6 The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether "using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch
to investigate the contents of the home is a 'search' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment."" 7
To answer the question, the Court first determined that the investigation took place in an area protected by the Constitution."' The Court
noted that "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion" is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment."' Justice Scalia's opinion pointedly observed that
this right would be diminished if law enforcement agents "could stand
in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity,"
or could "enter a man's property to observe his repose from just outside
the front window." 20 The officers had entered the curtilage of the
home, which is the area around the home that is "'intimately linked to
the home, both physically and psychologically,' and is where 'privacy
expectations are most heightened.'" 2
After concluding that the investigation took place in a constitutionally
protected area, the Court next considered "whether [the investigation]

114. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt, Earl of
Chatham).
115. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
116. Id. at 1413.
117. Id.
118. Id at 1414.
119. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
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was accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion."122The
Court recognized that there is a customary license that a citizen, or a
police officer, can approach a home, knock, and wait briefly to see if
anyone is home,2 s but the scope of that license is limited to a specific
purpose." "[Tihe background social norms that invite a visitor to the
front door do not invite him there to conduct a search."12 5
The Court in Jardines concluded that "[tihe government's use of
trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 26
The Court rejected the argument that, in determining whether a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred, it was necessary for the Court to
determine whether the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy
had been violated.127 The Court explained that "[tihe Katz reasonableexpectations test 'has been added to, not substituted for,' the traditional
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is
unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by
physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas."2 s
Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied on a "property-rights baseline"
that "keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned
only by physically intruding on Jardines'[s] property to gather evidence
is enough to establish that a search occurred." 129

122. Id.
123. Id. "Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require finegrained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the [nlation's Girl
Scouts and trick-or-treaters." Id.
124. Id. at 1416.
125. Id.
To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome);
to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or
marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking
permission, would inspire most of us to-well, call the police.
Id.
126. Id. at 1417-18.
127. Id. at 1417. The Supreme Court's decision last term in Jones reasoned,
Our later cases, of course, have deviated from [an] exclusively property-based
approach. In Katz v. United States,we said that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places," and found a violation in attachment of an eavesdropping
device to a public telephone booth. Our later cases have applied the analysis of
Justice Harlan's concurrence in that case, which said that a violation occurs when
government officers violate a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) and Katz,
389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal citations omitted).
128. Jardines,133 S. Ct. at 1417 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952) (emphasis omitted).
129. Id.
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IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRiVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . .; nor

shall any person be subject for the same [offense] to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ... m
To some, silence is golden; to others, it is "insolubly ambiguous."''
The defendant in Salinas v. Texas'32 voluntarily, and without being
placed in custody, answered questions from a police officer regarding a
murder investigation. 33 During the questioning, the officer asked if
a ballistics test would match shell casings found at the crime scene with
the defendant's gun, and instead of answering, the defendant "'[looked
down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his
hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.'"" The defendant was
charged with murder, and at trial, the prosecutors argued that his
reaction suggested he was guilty.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salinas in order to resolve
the Circuit split concerning whether "the prosecution may use a
defendant's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during
a noncustodial police interview as part of its case in chief."136 The
Court did not reach that question, however, because the defendant did
not expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during
his interview."' The Court reiterated that "we have long held that a

130. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
131. Hawkins v. Le Fevre, 758 F.2d 866,867 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 617 (1976)).
132. 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
133. Id. at 2177.
134. Id. at 2178 (alterations in original).

135. Id.
136. Id. at 2179. Compare United States v. Rivera, 944 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1991) ("The government may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to the
time that he is arrested and given his Mirandawarnings."), with United States v. Moore,
104 F.3d 377, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Neither Doyle nor any other case stands for the
proposition advanced by the prosecution that the defendant's silence can be used against
him so long as he has not received his Mirandawarnings. Logically, none could.").
137. Id.
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. must claim it' at

the time he relies on it.""as
The Court explained that a witness is excused from affirmatively
invoking the right to remain silent except for two circumstances. 3 9
First, a witness need not take the stand at trial to assert her right to
remain silent because a defendant has an "absolute right not to
testify."4 o Second, failure to assert one's Fifth Amendment right is
excused, "where governmental coercion makes . . . forfeiture of the

privilege involuntary," such as a custodial interview in which the
defendant has not been advised of his Miranda rights, or under the
threat to withdraw government benefits."' In short, "a witness need
not expressly invoke the privilege where some form of official compulsion
denies him a 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."" 2
The defendant in Salinas merely stood mute in response to a question
posed during an undisputedly voluntary interview."' In those circumstances, one must expressly invoke his right to remain silent.

138. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 433
(1970)).
141. Id. at 2180 (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
142. Id. (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648,657 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
143. Id.

